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distinctly know any of those things; and, not then knowing this rule by which I assure myself of the truth, I was led to believe them by reasons which I have since recognized to be less strong than I then imagined them to be. What further objection, then, can be made? Will it be that perhaps I am asleep (an objection which I myself formerly made), or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the reveries which we imagine in our sleep? But even when I am asleep, all that is presented to my mind with evidence is absolutely true.

And thus I recognize very clearly that the certainty and the truth of all science depends solely on the knowledge of the true God: so that before knowing him I could not perfectly know any other thing. And now that I know him, I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge concerning an infinitude of things, not only of those which are in him, but also of those which belong to corporeal nature in so far as it can serve as the object of mathematical demonstrations which do not take into consideration his existence.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO.

Translated from the German of G. W. F. HIEGEL.

[The following translation includes the whole of the extended notice given to Plato in the second volume of Hegel's History of Philosophy. About two fifths is devoted to the general features of Plato's Philosophy, after which follow special considerations of (1) The Dialectic, (2) Philosophy of Nature, (3) Philosophy of Spirit. The three special treatises are reserved for the next number of this Journal. The Philosophy of Aristotle, treated by the same masterly hand, will form a fitting continuation to this undertaking. In the philosophy of Plato, and especially in that of Aristotle, Hegel finds all speculative philosophy—either in germ or considerably expanded; and he who reads for the first time these notices will be continually surprised by the marvellous accuracy with which those great Greeks have expressed insights that are usually accredited to modern thought. Nothing lends so much to that philosophic calm, which accompanies a feeling of repose in the Truth, as the re-discovery of one's thought in the systems of the ancient masters. "Surely it is no subjective illusion of mine—this speculative thought—for it has been tried in the fire of History for two thousand years, and still remains as the frame-work of all science and all forms of practical life. Dante, who calls Aristotle "the master of those who know" (*Vidi 'l Maestro di color che sanno*), was well acquainted with this secure feeling which a knowledge of Truth gives, and thus gives utterance to it in the fourth canto of the *Paradise* (a passage Hegel loved to quote):

Jo veggio ben, che giammai non si sazia
 Nostro intelletto, se il ver non lo illustra
 Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia
Posasi in esso come fera in lustra
Tosto che giunto l'ha: e giunger puollo,
 Se non ciascun disio sarebbe frustra.]

I.

The development of philosophic science as science, and, more especially, the development of the Socratic standpoint to a scientific completeness, begins with Plato and ends with Aristotle. For this reason these two men deserve to be called the teachers of the human race—if such a title can be justly applied to any men.

Plato belongs to the followers of Socrates—is the most famous of the friends and auditors of Socrates; he seizes in its truth the Socratic principle that *Consciousness is the essence*; inasmuch as, according to Plato, *Thought is the absolute, and all reality is thought*. By this must not be understood the one-sided [abstract] thought, such as is spoken of in a one-sided idealism, wherein thought is seized as in opposition to reality; not this, but thought which is one with reality, i. e. the **COMPREHENSION AND ITS REALITY** as they are united in the movement of Science as the Idea of a scientific whole, [The Comprehension (*Begriff*)—the exhaustive apprehension, i. e. the universal and necessary relations of an object, seized together, making a complete definition of what is essential.] Socrates seized the in-and-for-itself existent thought only as *end and aim for the self-conscious will*; Plato leaves this narrow point of view, and expands the merely abstract right of the self-conscious thinking, which Socrates set up as his principle, to the province of Science; and through this he made possible the process of construing and deduction from principles, although even Plato's exposition, as we shall see, is not quite scientific.

Plato is one of the world-historical personages, and his Philosophy is one of the world-historic existences, and from its origin on through all succeeding times it has had a most significant influence upon the culture and development of spirit. For the peculiarity of the Platonic Philosophy is precisely this direction toward the intellectual, supersensuous world; it seeks the elevation of Consciousness into the realm of Spirit; so that the spiritual, that which belongs to thought,

obtains importance in this shape for Consciousness, and is so revealed to it, that, conversely, Consciousness gets a firm foothold upon this ground. The Christian Religion also has set up this high principle, that the internal spiritual essence of man is his true essence, and has made it the universal principle (although this principle has in Christianity a peculiar form representing man as destined for blessedness). But Plato and his Philosophy has contributed the greatest impulse towards this: to make that idea become this organization of the Rational, this realm of the supersensuous; he had already made a great beginning thereto.

His Life.

We have first to mention the circumstances of his life. Plato was an Athenian; was born in the 3d year of the 87th Olympiad, or according to Dodwell Ol. 87-4 (429 B. C.) at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the year in which Pericles died. He was, according to this, 39 or 40 years younger than Socrates. His father Ariston traced his pedigree to Codrus; his mother Perictione descended from Solon. His mother's uncle on the father's side was the famous Kritias, who likewise went round with Socrates for a long time, and was the most talented, genial, and therefore also the most dangerous and hated of the thirty tyrants of Athens. Kritias is usually counted with the Cyrenaics, Theodorus and Diagoras of Melos, by the Ancients, as an atheist; Sextus Empiricus has preserved for us a pretty fragment of a poem of his. Plato, born of this illustrious race, lacked not the means for his culture; he received an education at the hands of the most famous Sophists, who practised him in all the arts which were esteemed fitting for an Athenian. He received at a later period, from his teacher, the name of Plato; in his family he was called Aristokles. Some ascribed his name to the breadth of his forehead, others to the wealth of his discourse, others to the fine shape of his figure. In his youth he cultivated poetry and wrote tragedies—just as also with us the young poets begin with tragedies,—dithyrambs, and songs. Of the last, there are several still preserved to us in the Greek Anthology which go to his various loved ones; among others, a well-known epigram on an “Aster,” one of his best friends, which

contains a pretty thought, that is found also in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*:

“To the stars thou look'st, my Aster;
O, would that I were the heavens,
So that I could see thee with so many eyes.”

For the rest, he thought of nothing else during his youth but of devoting himself to state affairs. In his twentieth year he was brought to Socrates, and had eight years' intercourse with him. It is related that Socrates, on the night before, had dreamed that a young swan sat on his knees, whose wings grew fast, and that he soon flew up into heaven with the loveliest songs. The Ancients mention many such things which indicate the high honor and love in which he was held by his contemporaries and his successors for that silent greatness and sublime simplicity and loveliness which has earned for him the name of “the divine.” The society and wisdom of Socrates could not suffice for Plato. He busied himself also with the more ancient Philosophies, principally with that of Heraclitus. Aristotle mentions that already before he came to Socrates he had been in the society of Cratylus, and had been initiated into the Heraclitic doctrines. He studied also the Eleatics and especially the Pythagoreans, and associated with the most famous Sophists. After he thus became absorbed in Philosophy, he lost his interest in Poetry and the affairs of the state, renounced them entirely, and devoted himself wholly to the Sciences. His duty as an Athenian to serve in the time of war, he fulfilled as Socrates had done; he is said to have made three campaigns.

After the execution of Socrates, Plato as well as many other Philosophers, fled from Athens and betook themselves to Euclid at Megara. From thence he soon travelled farther, at first to Cyrene in Africa, where he applied himself especially to Mathematics under the guidance of the famed mathematician Theodorus, whom he introduces into several of his dialogues. Plato himself did something for the perfection of Mathematics. The solution of the Delian or Delphic problem is ascribed to him, which was given out by the oracle and which relates to the cube: namely, to describe a line whose cube is equal to the sum of two given cubes. This demands a construction through two curves. It is worthy of

notice that the oracle at that time gave out such problems: there was then an epidemic, in which when one applied to the oracle, scientific problems were given; it was a very remarkable change in the spirit of the oracle. From Cyrene Plato went to Italy and Egypt. In Magna-Grecia he became acquainted with the Pythagoreans of that time, Archytas of Tarentum, the famed mathematician, Philolaus, and others; and, besides this, he bought up the writings of the older Pythagoreans at heavy prices. In Sicily he formed a friendship with Dion. He returned to Athens and came out as a teacher, conversing with his scholars in the Academy, a grove or promenade laid out in honor of the hero Academus, in which a gymnasium was kept. But Plato became the true hero of the Academy, and has obliterated the old meaning of the name "Academy," and has eclipsed the fame of the hero, in whose place he sat; hence Academus has come down to posterity under the protection of Plato.

His residence and business in Athens, Plato interrupted by a two years' visit to Sicily, to Dionysius the younger, the ruler of Syracuse and Sicily. This connection with Dionysius was the most significant, or rather the *only*, external relation into which Plato entered, but it produced nothing durable. The next of kin to Dionysius, Dion, and other distinguished Syracusans, friends of Dionysius, had the hope that Dionysius—whom his father had allowed to grow up very uncultured, and in whom they had infused the ideas of Philosophy and a respect for it, and had made him very anxious to become acquainted with Plato,—they hoped that Dionysius would gain very much through an acquaintance with Plato, and would be so influenced through Plato's idea of a true state that he would proceed to realize it in Sicily. Plato consented partly through friendship to Dion, partly because he entertained the higher hope of seeing through Dionysius the true form of the state actualized; he was led to take the wrong step and travel to Sicily. Superficially looked at, the notion of a young prince near whom stands a wise man who inspires him by his instruction is quite plausible and forms the basis of a hundred political romances; but it is empty and delusive. Dionysius found indeed much pleasure in Plato, and conceived such a respect for him that he wished, in turn, to win Plato's respect; but

this did not long hold out. Dionysius was one of those moderate natures who in their halfness strive for fame and distinction, but are capable of no depth and no earnestness; but have only the appearance of it, and are without firm characters—a desire without capacity: as in our day Irony brings a person upon the stage who supposes himself apt and excellent, and yet is only a bungler. And such a result is natural, for the halfness allows only itself to guide; but precisely this halfness it is also which, while it lays the plan, at the same time renders it impracticable. The disagreement broke out in a collision of personalities against each other; Dionysius fell into a quarrel with his relative Dion, and Plato became involved in it because he was unwilling to give up his friendship with Dion, and Dionysius was not capable of a friendship which was founded upon respect and an earnest purpose in common; he had only a personal inclination towards Plato, and his vanity was a leading motive in connecting himself with him. Thus Dionysius could not succeed in attaching Plato to himself firmly; he desired to possess him exclusively, and this was a desire which could not be permitted by Plato.

Plato therefore left Dionysius; after the separation, both felt the desire to meet again. Dionysius called him back to bring about a reconciliation; for he could not endure the thought that he had not been able to bind Plato fast to him; he found it especially unendurable that Plato would not give up Dion. Plato gave way to the importunity of his family and of Dion, and principally of Archytas and other Pythagoreans at Tarentum, to whom Dionysius had applied, and who had interested themselves also for the reconciliation of Dionysius with Dion and Plato; nay, they became surety for his safety and freedom to depart again. Dionysius, however, could not endure the presence of Plato any better than his absence; he found his presence a constraint. Through Plato and the others surrounding Dionysius, a respect for science had been kindled in him, but he could not be brought into anything deeper. His participation in the Philosophy was as superficial as his numerous essays in Poetry; and while he desired to be all, poet, philosopher, and statesman, he could not bear to be guided by another. Thus there was estab-

blished no deep relation, but they alternately approached and separated: so that even the third residence in Sicily ended with coolness; after that the relation was not renewed. This time the tension against the relation with Dion grew so strong, that, when Plato wished to leave with Dion, from dissatisfaction at the treatment of Dionysius, the latter prevented him, and would have used violence at last had not the Pythagoreans come from Tarentum and obtained his release, and brought him to Greece. And they were aided by this circumstance: Dionysius feared the scandal of not being able to live on good terms with Plato. Thus Plato's hopes were destroyed; it was a mistake of his to attempt to adapt through Dionysius the constitution of the state to the demands of his philosophical idea.

After this Plato refused other states which expressly applied to him and sent for him (among whom were the inhabitants of Cyrene and Arcadia), and would not become their law-giver. It was a time in which many Greek states did not prosper with their constitutions, and were not able to find anything new as a substitute. In our time [1820], during the last thirty years, there also have been many constitutions made; and any man who has busied himself therewith finds it easy to make such ones. But theoretical labors do not suffice for the making of constitutions; individuals cannot make them; they are of a spiritual, divine nature, and are developed through History. The thought of an individual signifies nothing against this power of the world-spirit; and if such thoughts do signify anything, i. e. can be realized, then they are nothing else than the product of this power of the spirit of the time. The notion to have Plato become a law-giver was an anachronism; Solon and Lycurgus, it is true, were law-givers, but in the time of Plato this office was not possible any longer. Plato refused further concession to the wishes of states because they would not consent to the first condition which he laid down; and this was the abolishing of all private property. We shall consider this principle later with his Practical Philosophy.

Thus honored everywhere, and especially in Athens, Plato lived to the first year of the 108th Olympiad (348 B. C.), and

died on his birth-day, at a wedding feast, in the 81st year of his age.

Plato's Writings.

We have first to speak of the external form in which Plato's Philosophy has come down to us; and this includes the writings that we have of him: they are without doubt one of the fairest heritages which fate has preserved to us from antiquity. To expound his Philosophy however, which is given in these writings in a form not really scientific, is an undertaking not rendered difficult so much through that unscientific form as through the fact that this Philosophy has been understood differently at different epochs; and especially through the fact that it has been manipulated by unskillful hands in modern times. These manipulators have either brought into it their crude conceptions, incapable of seizing what is spiritual in a spiritual manner, or else have considered that as the essential and most remarkable in Plato's Philosophy which does not belong to philosophy at all in fact, but only to the form of conception. But after all it is only ignorance of Philosophy that renders difficult the apprehension of the Platonic Philosophy. The form and content of these works are of like attractiveness and importance. In their study we must however know beforehand what we have a right to seek in them and can expect to find; and, on the other hand, we must not forget that the Platonic standpoint does not admit of some of the ideas familiar to modern times since its time was not ripe for it. Thus it may very well happen that the writings do not satisfy at all the want with which *we* enter Philosophy; it is however always better that they should *not* entirely satisfy us, than that we should look upon them as the *ultimatum*, the last words on the subject. Plato's standpoint is definite, and a necessary one, but we in our time cannot hold implicitly to him, nor can we transplant ourselves back to the spirit of his time; for Reason now makes higher demands. To set him up as our highest thinker, and his standpoint as the one that we must accept—this course belongs to the weaklings of our time, who cannot sustain the great, the really immense demands of the present spirit of humanity, and hence feel oppressed and flee back, faint-hearted, to him.

One must stand above Plato: i. e. know the needs of the thinking spirit in our time, or rather *have* this need. As in the science of Pedagogy the endeavor is to educate men so as to protect them from the external world, i. e. to fit them for special spheres—that of the counting-house, for example—in which special spheres they know nothing of the world without and take no notice of it; thus in Philosophy they go back to religious faith, and thus too to the Platonic Philosophy. Both are phases which have their essential standpoint and position; but they are not the Philosophy of our time. It may be right to go back to Plato in order to learn again from him the idea of Speculative Philosophy; but it is a piece of frivolity to ape the poetic freedom of his style in dialogues concerning Universal Beauty and Excellence. The literary Messrs. Schleiermachers—and that critical discrimination which discusses whether the one or the other Dialogue be genuine (concerning the great ones there can be no doubt, according to the testimony of the Ancients)—these are for Philosophy quite superfluous, and belong to the hypercriticism of our time.

Style.

Secondly, the character of the Platonic works offers to us in their manifoldness different styles of philosophizing; and this becomes the first difficulty which prevents the understanding of the Platonic Philosophy. Did we still possess the oral discourses (*ágrapha dógmata*) of Plato under the title “Upon the Good” (*peri tagathou*) which his disciples mention, and those “On Philosophy,” or “Upon Ideas,” or “Upon the Good” (upon which Brandis has written), which Aristotle cites and seems to have before him when he treats of Platonic Philosophy: then we should have his Philosophy in a simple form, because he treated it systematically in those works. But we have only his dialogues; and this shape makes it difficult for us to obtain a definite notion of his Philosophy. The form of the dialogue contains namely very heterogeneous elements, in which real philosophizing concerning the absolute essence, and the pictured conceptions about it are mixed up promiscuously; and this constitutes precisely the mixture found in the Platonic works.

Esoteric and Exoteric.

Another difficulty is said to be this: that one should distinguish what is exoteric from what is esoteric Philosophy. Tennemann says: "Plato reserves to himself that privilege which is conceded to every thinker, viz., the privilege of imparting of his discoveries only so much as he found good, and only to those to whom he might entrust their reception. Aristotle, too, had an esoteric and exoteric Philosophy, with only this difference, that it was with him a merely *formal* distinction, while with Plato it was also a *material* one." How simple! He speaks as though a philosopher might be in possession of his thoughts just like external things! But the philosophical idea is in reality something quite different—men do not possess it, but, on the contrary, *it* rather possesses the men. When philosophers explain themselves concerning philosophical objects they must be guided by their ideas; they cannot hold them in their pockets; and if one speaks with another in an external manner, the idea is always implied in what they say, if what they say only has content. To the delivery of an external thing there does not belong much, but to the communication of an idea there belongs fitness; this remains always esoteric, and hence one has not to deal with what is merely exoteric in philosophers. These are superficial conceptions.

What Person speaks for Plato?

One need not count among the difficulties of comprehending the real speculations of Plato, the external side, that Plato in his dialogues speaks not *in propria persona*, but introduces Socrates and many others discoursing, of whom one does not always know which one really conveys Plato's opinion. In respect to this historical circumstance which seems to pertain to the many-sidedness of Plato, there has been much said by ancients and moderns; "he has only represented historically the manner and doctrine of Socrates;" "adopted much in his dialogues from this or that sophist, and evidently brought forward many old Philosophemes, principally Pythagorean, Heraclitic and Eleatic, and in the last accordingly the Eleatic form of treatment very much appears"; so that, accord-

ing to these views, these Philosophies would form the entire matter of the works and only the external form would belong to Plato ;—it is therefore necessary on this account to distinguish what really belongs to him and what does not, and to see whether those ingredients harmonize with each other. In the Socratic dialogues as Cicero gives them one can easily make out the persons, but with Cicero there is no fundamental interest [i. e. speculative content] in question. With Plato, however, there is no real ambiguity ; the difficulty is only apparent. From the dialogues of Plato, his Philosophy comes out quite clearly ; for they are not like the dialogues of many writers which consist of a collection of monologues, wherein one person holds this opinion, another that, and each remains of the same opinion finally. But the differences of opinion which occur are examined, and the result is that the true is arrived at ; or the entire movement of thought in the dialogue, when the result is a negative one, belongs to Plato. Hence what belongs to Plato or to Socrates in the dialogue is evident without further investigation. It is, however, to be remarked that since the essence of Philosophy is the same, each philosopher must necessarily take up the preceding Philosophies into his own ; what properly belongs to him, is how he has carried them out and developed them to a higher degree. Philosophy is therefore not a mere individual affair like a work of art ; and even in this it is mostly skill which the artist has acquired from others that gives him success. The invention of the artist is the thought of his whole work [i. e. his IDEAL], and the intelligent application of the previously found and prepared means ; the immediate impressions and peculiar inventions may be infinite in number. But Philosophy has one thought, one essence, lying at the basis ; and in the place of the earlier true recognition of the same, nothing else can be substituted, but it itself must enter into the later Philosophies with the same necessity as it first appeared. I have therefore already remarked that Plato's dialogues are not to be looked upon as though it was their business to give currency to the systems of different philosophers, nor as though his Philosophy was an Eclectic Philosophy which was formed out of them ; they are rather the knots in which these abstract, one-sided principles are now united in a truly concrete manner.

In the general conception of a History of Philosophy we have already seen that such knots occur in the line of progress of philosophic development, and in these it is that the True arrives at concreteness. The Concrete is the unity of different determinations, or principles ; these, in order to become developed, in order to come clearly before consciousness, must first be set up for and by themselves [each one as the sole truth]. Through this they receive as a matter of course the shape of one-sided abstractions as compared with the following higher one ; the latter, however, does not destroy them, nor let them lie unnoticed, but takes them up as moments of its own higher principle. In the Platonic Philosophy we see, therefore, many Philosophemes which belong to an earlier time, but they are taken up into Plato's deeper principle and therein united. This relation is possible from the fact that the Platonic Philosophy exhibits a totality of the idea : hence, as result, it includes in itself the principles of the previous Philosophies. Plato in many of his works attempts nothing else but an exposition of the more ancient Philosophies ; and what there is peculiarly his own in these expositions consists only in the fact that he has expanded them. His *Timæus*, according to all testimony, is the enlargement of a Pythagorean writing which we still possess ; and, in the case of the *Parmenides*, Plato's enlargement is of such a kind that its original principle is cancelled in its one-sidedness.

The Form of the Platonic Exposition.

For the removal of these last two difficulties, as a solution of the first, the *form* is to be characterized in which Plato has propounded his ideas ; and another point is, to separate it from that which is Philosophy as such with him. The form of the Platonic Philosophy, as is well known, is that of the dialogue. The beauty of this form is especially attractive : yet one must not (as frequently happens) hold that it is the most perfect form of philosophical exposition ; it is a peculiarity of Plato's, and as a work of art is worthy of being considered.

First, to the external form belongs the *scenery* and the *dramatic shape*. Plato makes for his dialogues a surrounding of actuality,—in the locality and persons, and begins with

some individual occasion which brings together these persons, all of which is of itself very lovely and open. The chief person is Socrates; among the others are many well known stars, such as Agathon, Zeno, Aristophanes, &c. We come to a place: in Phædrus to a Plane-tree, to the clear waters of the Ilyssus, through which Socrates and Phædrus pass together; in other dialogues the place is at the halls of the Gymnasia, at the Academy, or at a banquet. For the reason that Plato himself never comes in by name, but puts his thoughts in the mouths of other persons, he clears himself of all that is thetic or dogmatic, perfectly; and we see just as little of the one who manipulates the machinery of the exhibition as we do in the histories of Thucydides or in Homer. Xenophon permits his personality to appear at times, and he exhibits everywhere the desire to justify the life and teachings of Socrates through examples. With Plato, on the contrary, all is quite objective and plastic; and he uses great art in removing far from himself his statements of doctrines, often putting them in the mouth of the third or fourth person.

In the Tone of the exposition as regards the personal behavior of those who take part, there prevails moreover the most noble urbanity of cultivated men; one learns then what refinement of manner is, and sees the man of the world who knows how to demean himself properly. Politeness does not quite express "urbanity," and contains something more, something superfluous, namely, expressions of respect, of preference, and obligation; urbanity is the true politeness, and lies at the basis of it. Urbanity, however, holds fast to this: it concedes to each one with whom one speaks, perfect personal freedom of sentiments and opinions, as well as the right to utter them; so that one even in rejoinder and counterstatement implies in his tone that he holds his own utterance as a subjective one compared with the utterance of the other; for it is a conversation into which persons enter as persons, and not the objective reason speaking with itself. Hence, in all the energy of utterance it is always borne in mind that the other is also a thinking person: one must not speak oracularly, nor browbeat another. This urbanity is, however, not feigned, but rather the greatest frankness and sincerity; and this constitutes the charm of the dialogues of Plato.

The dialogue is, finally, not a conversation in which what one says has and should have a contingent connection so as not to exhaust the subject. If one wishes merely to "converse," then chance and the caprice of fancy guide the discourse. In the introduction, it is true, the dialogues of Plato have at times also this form of conversation, consequently the appearance of proceeding without design; he makes Socrates set out from the particular conceptions of individuals, from their circle of ideas; but later the dialogue comes to the development of the theme and the subjective phase of conversation vanishes, and then begins a fairer and more consequent dialectical progress. Socrates speaks, proceeds by himself in his argument, draws a conclusion, and gives to all this an external turn, putting it in the form of a question; for most of the questions are directed in such a manner that the person interrogated answers only yes or no. The dialogue would seem to be best adapted to exhibit an argument, because it moves alternately to and fro; its different sides are divided up among different persons, so that the theme gets life and animation. But the dialogue has this disadvantage—that the movement of the discussion seems to be guided by caprice; the feeling always remains therefore, at the end of the dialogue, that the subject might have been treated differently and had different results. In the Platonic dialogues, however, this caprice is only apparent; for the unfolding of the dialogue is in fact only a development of the subject-matter, and little is left to the persons conversing. Such persons, as we have seen in the dialogues quoted in our chapter on Socrates, are plastic persons in the dialogue. It is not their business merely to give their opinions, or, as the French express it, *pour placer son mot*. As in the examination in the Catechism the answers are prescribed, so in these dialogues; for the author makes those who answer speak what he chooses. The question is so directed to the point, that only a quite simple answer is possible; and in this consists precisely the beauty and greatness of this dialogic art, and by this means also it gains the appearance of *naïveté*.

Now there is combined with this external side of personality, in the first place, the fact that the Platonic Philosophy does not announce itself as a special field in which is begun some special science in its proper sphere; but it admits the validity of the

ordinary conceptions of the existing culture—those of Socrates, for example, as well as those of the Sophists and also of the earlier Philosophies—and refers likewise in the course of the procedure to examples, and the modes of view prevailing. A systematic exposition of Philosophy we could not expect to find in this form. In this lies the inconvenience for a general survey, since no standard is at hand by which to decide whether the subject is exhausted or not. Notwithstanding this, it is pervaded by one spirit, and one definite standpoint of Philosophy is portrayed in it, though this spirit does not appear in the definite form that our time demands. The philosophical culture of Plato as well as the general culture of his time was not yet ripe for real scientific works; the idea was yet too fresh and new, and it was reserved for Aristotle to be the first to succeed with a scientific, systematic exposition.

Defect of the Philosophic Standpoint.

With this defect on the part of the form in Plato's exposition there is connected also a defect in view of the concrete determination of the idea itself, since there is a mixing up of the different elements of the Platonic Philosophy which are presented in these dialogues, namely, the mere opinions concerning Essence are intermingled with the strict comprehensive statements of the same, in a loose, popular manner, so that especially the former often assume a mythical exposition;—a mingling which is unavoidable in the earliest stages of real science seeking its true form. Plato's sublime mind, which had an intuition or representation of Spirit as such, penetrated its object with the speculative comprehension; but he only *began* this penetration, and did not as yet grasp together the entire reality thereof with the comprehension: or the knowing which appeared in Plato was not yet realized as a complete whole. Here it happens, therefore, that the notion of essence is separated again from its comprehension, and falls into opposition with it, so that he has not distinctly expressed the doctrine that the comprehension alone is the true essence: hence we see Plato speak of "God" and again of the "Absolute essence of things," but isolatedly, or in such a connection that the two seem to be separated, and "God" to be a term

employed by Representation to express the uncomprehended Essence. There enters also into the treatment for the further elaboration and reality of the exposition, the products of fancy; in the place of scientific procedure (in accordance with the comprehension), we have myths—i. e. self-developed movements of phantasy, or stories taken from the realm of sensuous representation, which, though defined by thought, are not thoroughly interpenetrated by it. In general, what is spiritual is determined through the forms of representation; there are taken up, for example, sensuous phenomena of the body, or of nature at large, and thoughts about them are paraded which do not at all exhaust the subject; they are not thoroughly thought out, and the comprehension [i. e. the exhaustive idea of the whole] does not proceed [develop] independently in itself.

From these two causes it happens in the apprehension of the Platonic Philosophy that either too much or too little is found in it. The Ancients, the so-called Neo-Platonists, find too much; they allegorized the Greek Mythology and presented it as an expression of ideas (which myths, of course, always are), and they have likewise found the ideas contained in the Platonic myths and put them into the form of Philosophemes (in this consists solely the merit of Philosophy, that it exhibits the True in the [scientific] form of the Comprehension): so, too, what is found in a scientific form in Plato, is taken by the Neo-Platonists for the expression of the Absolute essence—e. g. the doctrine of essence in Parmenides is taken for “Plato’s Theology”—as though Plato himself had not made a distinction between the two. Even in the Platonic pure thought, representation as such [thinking with images], is not entirely dispensed with: or it is not expressly said that these pure thoughts are in themselves the essence; i. e. they do not have a higher meaning for Plato than representations do, and are not essence itself.—The moderns are apt to find too little; for they cling to the side of representation and see reality in it. What is found in Plato in the form of Comprehension, or as purely speculative, is apt to pass with them for a manipulation of abstract logical conceptions, or, as they express it, for “empty hair-splitting”: and that which is given in the form of representation passes with them for a Philoso-

pheme. Thus we find in Tennemann and others a strict reduction of Platonic philosophy to the forms of our formal Metaphysics; see, for example, his proof of the Being of God.

However famous the mythic exposition of the philosophemes in Plato may be, and although it constitutes the attractive element in his dialogues, yet it gives rise to much misunderstanding; and it is a mistake to hold these myths for the most excellent part of Plato's philosophy. Many philosophemes are indeed brought nearer to intelligibility through the mythical exposition; yet it is not a true form of exposition; philosophemes are thoughts which, in order to be pure, must be stated as thoughts. The myth is an exposition which always employs sensuous pictures which are directed to the faculty of representation and not to the thinking activity; therein lies, however, a weakness of thought which knows that it does not yet hold things firmly, and hence is not yet the free thought. The myth belongs to the pedagogy of the human race, in that it excites and allures one to busy himself with the content; as an impure statement of thought through the use of sensuous forms, it cannot express what the thought intends. When the ability to comprehend is acquired, then the myth is needed no longer. Plato frequently says: it is difficult to express himself on this subject, and hence he will have recourse to a myth; this is easier, of course. And Plato says of simple concepts, that they are dependent transitory moments which have their ultimate truth in God; and as he now speaks of God for the first time [i. e. without defining or deducing the idea of God], it is a mere representation. Thus the style of representation and the genuinely speculative intermingle.

Hence in order to derive the philosophy of Plato from his dialogues, it is necessary to separate what belongs to representation (imagination) from the philosophic idea itself, especially in those places where he has recourse to a myth for the exposition of a philosophic idea; only by this precaution can one find out what belongs only to the form of representation, and as such is not essential to the thought. But if the reader does not of himself know what *Comprehension* is, i. e. what the Speculative consists in, then there is great danger that when he is engaged with these myths he will derive a multi-

tude of propositions and theorems from the dialogues, and offer them as Platonic philosophemes, when they are in reality nothing of the kind, but are merely forms of representation. Thus, e. g., Plato in his *Timæus* makes use of the form of expression that God made the world and that dæmons had certain functions to perform in the work; this statement is made quite in the form of representation [i. e. symbolically]. Now, if it is taken for a philosophical dogma of Plato, that God created the world, and that higher creatures of a spiritual kind exist, and have assisted God in the creation, although it must be confessed that this stands literally in Plato, yet it does not belong to his philosophy. When he says in the form of representation [i. e. symbolically] that the soul of man has a rational and an irrational part, this is to be taken without reserve; but Plato adds, not philosophically, that the soul is composed of two kinds of substances, two sorts of things. When he represents knowing and learning as reminiscence, this doctrine can be taken to mean that the soul of man pre-existed before his birth. Likewise when he speaks of the most important elements of his philosophy, of ideas, of the universal, as the abiding and independent, as the models of sensuous things, we could easily be led to think those ideas, after the manner of the modern "categories of the understanding," to be substances which exist in the intellect of God, or exist for themselves as independent beings, e. g. as angels, outside of the real world. In fine, all that is expressed in the form of representation [symbols] the moderns take for philosophy. Platonic philosophy can be construed in this way, and be justified by Plato's own words; but if one knows what philosophy is, he does not trouble himself about such symbolical expressions, and has no difficulty in discovering what Plato intended.

In the exposition of the Platonic philosophy itself which I now enter upon, although these two styles of writing cannot be entirely sundered, yet they must be carefully distinguished and criticised in a very different manner from that which is current in modern times. We have to unfold first Plato's general idea of philosophy and of scientific knowledge, and secondly the special provinces in which he applies this idea.

Plato's Idea of the Value of Philosophy—its place in the State.

As respects the general idea of philosophy, the first point to consider is the view that Plato held with reference to the value of philosophy. We see in him a man quite filled with the importance of the knowledge of philosophy; and he shows an enthusiasm for the thinking of that which is in-and-for-itself. The Cyrenaics set up the doctrine that the relation of existences to the individual consciousness is their essence, and the Cynics (posited) immediate freedom as essence: on the contrary, Plato posits the self-mediating unity of consciousness and essence, or scientific knowing. He expresses everywhere the sublimest views regarding the worth of philosophy, and he manifests the deepest feeling and clearest consciousness that all else is to be regarded as inferior; he speaks of it with the greatest animation, with energy, with all the pride of science; we should not dare to assume his attitude toward philosophy in our day. Of the so-called modesty of science in the presence of other spheres there is no trace to be found in his writings—not even of man toward God. Plato is fully conscious of the nearness and unity of the human reason to God. One is very tolerant when he reads this in Plato, an ancient, for it seems to be a thing entirely of the past; in a modern philosopher, however, it would be taken as very wicked. Philosophy is to Plato the highest possession, the essence, for men: it alone is that which man has to seek. From numerous passages on this subject, I quote one from the *Timæus*: "The knowledge of the most excellent things begins through the eyes. The distinction of the visible day from the night, the lunations and revolutions of the planets, have produced the knowledge of time and given rise to the investigation of the nature of the whole. Whence we have gained philosophy; and a greater good than it, given by God to men, has neither come nor will ever come."

One of the most famous and at the same time most condemned passages is that in which he expresses himself on this subject in the *Republic*, since it contradicts so much the ordinary notions of men; and it is the more striking inasmuch as it concerns the relation of philosophy to the state, and hence to the actuality. For although one may attribute high value to it in other respects, yet those have merely a

subjective value; here, however, it concerns the constitution and government, the actuality. After Plato has made Socrates expound the true state, he makes Glaucon interrupt this exposition by demanding of Socrates that he show how it is possible for such a state to exist. Socrates talks much round the point, will not come to it, seeks by subterfuges to avoid it, and asserts that he is not bound, when he gives a description of justice, also to explain how it may be established as an actual thing: grant this; yet one must adduce the means through which, if not perfection, at least an approximation thereto, may be made possible. At last, when the question is pressed upon him, he says: "It shall be spoken even if it is to be overwhelmed with a flood of laughter and perfect incredulity. Until philosophers rule in the state, or the now so-called kings and men in power philosophize truly and perfectly, and thus the ruling power and philosophy coincide—until the different dispositions are united which now are isolated, and engaged in these provinces separately for themselves, pursuing the one or the other; until then, oh friend Glaucon, there will be no end of evil for the people, nor, think I, for the human race in general; and this state of which I spokē will not be produced nor see the light of the sun before" this happens. "This it is," adds Socrates, "that I have so long delayed to say because I know that it goes so much against the common view." Plato makes Glaucon answer: "Socrates, you have expressed yourself in such a manner as to imply that you think that there are a multitude, and those not base people, who would throw off their mantles and grasp the nearest best weapons, and, assembled in closed ranks, make a charge upon you; and if you did not know how to appease them with reasons, you would have to repent bitterly."

Plato thus sets up the doctrine of the necessity of this union of philosophy and government. As regards this demand, it may well seem a great piece of presumption on their part to demand that the government of the state should be put into the hands of philosophers; for the basis of History is another than that of Philosophy. In History, the Idea as the absolute ruling power reproduces itself: in other words, God rules the world; yet History is the idea which is realized in the *natural* form and not with consciousness of it at the same

time. There is, of course, much respect paid to universal thoughts of right, ethics, what pleases God, &c.; yet for the most part actions flow from the impulses of the individual incited by special ends and aims. The actualization of the idea, therefore, is brought about through a mingling of thoughts and comprehensions with immediate particular ends; so that this actualization is produced only on one side through thought, but on the other side through circumstances, through human deeds, as means. These means seem often to be opposed to the idea, but this does not matter; all these limited purposes are in fact only means of producing the idea, because the Idea is the absolute power in the world. The idea, consequently, comes to existence in the world, since it has no lack of anything; [note the proof of the existence of God in the *Meditations of Descartes*: the Total and Universal has nothing to resist it;] it is, however, not necessary that political rulers be conscious of the idea.

In order to decide on the merits of this doctrine that the rulers of nations must be philosophers, it is necessary to consider well what is meant by philosophy in the Platonic sense and in the sense that was current in that time. The word "philosophy" has at different times had very different meanings. There was a time when they called a man who did not believe in ghosts, or in the existence of the devil, a philosopher. Notions of that sort are gone by, and it no longer occurs to any one to call a man a philosopher on this account. The English call that province philosophy which is known by us as experimental physics; a philosopher in England is, consequently, any one who makes such experiments, and possesses theoretical acquaintance with chemistry, mechanics, &c. With Plato, on the other hand, philosophy is confounded with the consciousness of the supersensuous which with us is termed religious consciousness; Platonic philosophy is thus the consciousness of what is essentially true and right, the consciousness of universal ends in the state, and their practical validity. In the entire history, from the migration of nations on to the time when Christianity became the universal religion, the business of philosophy has been nothing else but to realize the supersensuous realm which in the first place was for-and-by-itself—to realize this supersensuous

realm—that is to say, to mould the actuality into conformity with what is in-and-for-itself universal and true. This has been the further business of culture generally. A state, a government and constitution, in modern times has therefore quite another basis than a state of ancient times, and especially of the time in which Plato lived. The Greeks generally at that time were utterly discontented with their democratic constitutions and the state of affairs that resulted from them: so also have all philosophers condemned the democracies of the Greek states in which such things happened as the punishment of their generals. [See Grote's History of Greece, chap. LXIV.] Under such a constitution, one is apt to think, the most honorable treatment would be shown toward the best men of the state: in fact, however, arbitrariness and caprice held sway, and only for the moment was it restrained through such preponderating individualities and such geniuses in statesmanship as Aristides, Themistocles, and others;—a condition of affairs which preceded the downfall of this form of constitution. In our states, on the contrary, the end and aim of the state, the universal good, is immanent and powerful in quite a different way from that in ancient time. The legal status of things, the tribunals, the constitution, the will of the people is so firm in itself that it is only for the moment to be disturbed; and the question naturally arises whether anything at all is dependent upon the individual. "To govern" means, with us, to manage affairs in the actual state according to the nature of the circumstances; and this requires the ruler to have a consciousness of the nature of those circumstances; the actuality is to be brought into harmony with the comprehension [i. e. the Ideal], and hence the idea realized in existence. It is clear that when Plato says "Philosophy should govern," he means that the status of affairs should be directed and controlled through universal principles. This is carried out in modern states much more completely, inasmuch as universal principles are essentially their basis; of course, not in all modern states, but still in the greater part. Some are already upon this stage, others are in the midst of the struggle for it; but it is generally acknowledged that such principles ought to constitute the substantial basis of government and administration.

Thus the demand of Plato has been substantially realized in modern times. But what we call Philosophy, the activity of pure thought, concerns the form, which has a peculiar province; but it does not depend upon this form whether or not the Universal, freedom, the right, is made the principle of a state. An example of what a philosopher could accomplish upon a throne would be furnished in Marcus Aurelius; there are, however, only private deeds that can be mentioned of him, and the Roman empire was not bettered by him. Frederic II. is, on the other hand, with justice called the philosophical king. He busied himself with Wolfian metaphysics and French philosophy and made verses, and was thus a philosopher according to the notions of his time; philosophy seems to have been a special private concern of his own individual liking, and to have been distinct from his function as king. But he was also a philosophical king in the sense that he set up for his principle a quite universal end and aim, the welfare, the good of his state, in all his actions and in all directions, in opposition to stipulations with other states, and in opposition to particular rights [privileges] in his own country, which he subordinated to the in-and-for-itself universal end and aim. Later, when it becomes an ethical and customary affair to follow the course marked out, the princes are not any longer called philosophers, although the same principle is extant, and the government and the *institutions* especially are founded on it.

In the *Republic*, Plato speaks further yet, in an allegory, of the distinctions of condition in philosophic culture and of the necessity for the existence of philosophy; it is a prolix allegory which is remarkable for its brilliancy. He represents it as follows: "They conceive a subterranean dwelling like a cave with a long entrance open towards the light. Its inhabitants are fastened in such a manner that they cannot turn their heads, and thus can only look towards the back of the cave. Far behind their backs there burns a torch on high. In the interval there extends, above, a road, and along it is built a low wall, and behind this wall" (towards the light) "are found men who bear and hold up over it, like the puppets in a marionette-theatre, all sorts of statues of men and beasts, while they alternately converse with each other and

are silent. Those fettered ones are able to see only the shadows of these figures as they fall on the opposite wall, and they take these shadows for the true reality ; and they hear what is said by those who are holding the puppets as it reverberates from the wall in front of them and take it for the speech of the shadows. Now if it should so happen that one of them should get loose from his fetters and then was obliged to turn his neck so that he now could see things themselves, he would believe that which he now saw to be essenceless dreams, still thinking those shadows to be the true ; and if they drew up anyone into the light out of his prison, he would be blinded by the light and see nothing, and would hate those who drew him up to the light for having deprived him of the truth, and in place thereof prepared only pain and injury for him." This kind of myth belongs to what is peculiarly the province of the Platonic Philosophy, namely, to draw a distinction between the sensuous world in men and the consciousness of the supersensuous.

Inasmuch as we now have to speak more at length of this subject, we must, secondly, proceed to consider *the nature of knowing* as it is according to Plato, and with it begin the exposition of the Platonic Philosophy itself.

The Nature of Cognition.

(a) Plato defines philosophers as those "who have an appetite for looking at the truth" (*Republic*, Book V., chap. 20). Glaucon : "This is correct; but how do you illustrate it?"—Socrates : "I do not say this to every one; you will, however, agree with me in this."—"In what?"—"That since the beautiful is opposed to the ugly, they are two."—"Why not?"—"With justice and injustice, good and evil, and of every other idea, the same is true; each of them is one, taken for itself, though as to their relation with the actions and bodies and other ideas everywhere appearing, each one seems to be a manifold."—"You say right."—"I distinguish now according to this, on the one hand, the men who love public shows, delight in arts, and practical men; on the other hand, those of whom we are speaking and who alone are correctly called philosophers."—"How do you mean that?"—"Namely, such as delight to see spectacles and hear stories, love fine voices

and colors and shapes, and all that consists of the like ; but the nature of the Beautiful in general their thought is incapable of seeing and loving.”—“So it is.”—“But those capable of going to the Beautiful itself and seeing it for itself, are these not rare?”—“Yes indeed.”—“Now, whoever holds beautiful things for beautiful, but does not know Beauty itself, and when any one leads him to the knowledge of the same is not able to follow, do you suppose that he passes life in a waking or a dreaming state?” (i. e. the non-philosophic are compared to dreamers.) “For, see, to dream, is it not this: when one—be he asleep, or awake even—holds the likeness of a thing not for the likeness but for the thing itself which it resembles?”—“I would, of course, say of him that he dreams.”—“The waking man then, on the other hand, is he who holds the Beautiful itself for that which exists and who can recognize it as well as he can recognize that which only participates in it [i. e. sensuous things], and does not confound the two.”

In this philosophical exposition we see in some sort what the so much talked of Platonic Ideas are. The Idea is nothing but what is current with us under the name of the Universal, when this word is not taken in the sense of *formal* Universal—which is only a property of things—but as the in-and-for-itself existent, as the essence, as that which alone is true. We translate the Greek word “*eidos*” by “*genus*” or “*species*” (German, *Gattung*, or *Art*), and the idea is of course the *genus*, but in the form in which it is apprehended by thought and exists for it. When “*genus*” or “*species*” is seized as a number of similar determinations collected by reflection from several individuals, to serve as a *mark* for the convenience of the understanding, then we have the Universal in quite an external [superficial] form. The genus [generic element] of the animal is, however, his vitality ; this vitality is his substantiality, and if one takes this from him, nothing is left. Philosophy is thus to Plato in general the science of this in-itself Universal, to which he, in opposition to the individual, again and again returns. Diogenes Laertius relates: “When Plato spoke of the *table-ness* and *goblet-ness*, Diogenes the cynic said, ‘I see indeed a table and a goblet, but not the *table-ness* nor the *goblet-ness*.’ ‘Right,’ answered Plato ;

‘for though you have eyes which serve to see the table and the goblet, yet the wherewith to see table-ness and goblet-ness, i. e. *Reason*, you have not.’”—What Socrates began is thus completed by Plato, who recognizes only the Universal, the idea, the good, as the essential. By the exposition of his “Ideas” Plato has revealed the Intellectual-World, which, however, is not a “beyond” to Actuality, i. e. in heaven or some other place outside of existing reality, but the actual world itself. This is also what Leucippus has done: the ideal is brought nearer the actuality and not—metaphysically—placed behind nature. The essence of the doctrine of ideas is accordingly the view, that the True is not the sensuous existence, but that the True is that which is self-determined, in-and-for-itself universal, and that this alone is existent in the world: the intellectual-world is therefore the true, that which alone is worth knowing; it is the eternal, and in-and-for-itself [potential and actual] divine. Differences are not what endures, but what exists only in a state of change; yet the Absolute of Plato as that which is in-itself one and self-identical, is, at the same time, essentially *concrete*, inasmuch as it is a movement which returns into itself and is eternally by itself [i. e. self-contained]. The love for ideas is what Plato calls “enthusiasm.”

The misunderstanding which arises concerning the Platonic ideas is twofold. The first springs from that kind of thought which is formal, and holds that to be the true reality which is sensuously represented—what Plato calls mere shadows. When Plato, namely, speaks of the Universal as the Essence, such a habit of thought conceives the Universal only in the form of a property, i. e. as a mere thought [an abstraction made by and existing] in our understanding; or else it conceives that Plato takes this universal as substance, as an essence in itself, which in that case falls outside of us [i. e. has corporeal existence like the things for which it is substituted]. Again, when Plato uses the expression, “Sensuous things—like copies—resemble that which is in-and-for-itself,” or “the idea is their model and archetype,” these “ideas” if not exactly understood as if they were things, yet are taken for a sort of transcendental beings which lie somewhere outside of us, afar off in an extra-mundane intelligence, and

are pictured conceptions, which are kept out of sight like the model of the artist, according to which he fashions a given material and moulds it into shape. Inasmuch, namely, as they are removed from this sensuously objective actuality which passes for truth, and are separated from the actuality of the individual consciousness, it follows that the Ego which thinks them, and whose original representations they are, must be conceived as outside of consciousness and be represented always as something alien to it.

The second misunderstanding which prevails in respect to ideas, is, not that they lie outside of our consciousness, but that although they pass for necessary ideals of our reason, yet their productions neither have reality now, nor can ever reach it. As in the case just considered, where the "Beyond" was an extra-mundane conception in which the genera or species were regarded as substances, so in this case our *Reason* is taken as such a "beyond" to Reality. When, however, they are taken as the forms of Reality in us, then another misunderstanding arises inasmuch as they are seized as being of an æsthetic nature [i. e. belong to the sensory]; in this way they come to be regarded as "intellectual intuitions," which must be seen through immediate vision, and thus belong either to the fortunate possessor of genius, or to him who attains to a condition of ecstasy and inspiration. Such intellectual intuitions would be only products of imagination or phantasy; but Plato's Ideas are not such products, nor are such products adequate to the knowing of truth. The Ideas are not found in immediate consciousness, but they are to be reached only in and through scientific cognition: and they are immediate intuitions only in so far as they consist of the simple results which scientific cognition arrives at by its processes. In other words, Immediate intuition is only that phase in the process of knowing which seizes the simple result. For this reason, one cannot be said to *have* them (intellectual intuitions), but they are *produced* through the activity of the cognizing mind. Enthusiasm is their first irregular production, but scientific thought brings them first into a rationally developed shape and into the daylight: in it they are likewise real, for they are the only being.

Accordingly, Plato distinguishes, in the first place, *science*,

the knowledge of that which *is* in truth, from opinion (Republic V., chap. xxi. & xxii.): "Such a thinking as cognizes [systematically] we may reasonably call *science*, but the other should be called *opinion*. The scientific thought relates to that which *is*; opinion is opposed to it, but in such a manner that its content is not *nothing*—that would be ignorance—but it is something *opined*. Opinion is hence the middle ground between ignorance and science, and its content is a mingling of being and nought. Sensuous objects, the subject-matter of opinion—in short, *the individual*—only *participates* in the Beautiful, the Good, the Just, i. e. in the Universal; but it participates likewise in the Ugly, the Bad, the Unjust, &c. The twofold is likewise half of each. The individual is not merely *either* great *or* small, light *or* heavy, i. e. merely *one* of these opposites, but every individual is as well the one as the other. Such a mingling of being and non-being is the individual which is the object of opinion";—a mingling in which the oppositions have not been dissolved into the Universal. The latter [i. e. the solving the antitheses in the Universal] would be the speculative idea of science, while the ordinary form of our consciousness belongs to "opinion."

(b) Before we turn to the consideration of the objective, in-itself-existent content of scientific thought, we must first consider more in detail, the subjective existence of knowledge in consciousness, as Plato holds it; and secondly, how the content as soul *is*, or is manifested in Representation; and these two sides constitute the relation of scientific knowledge, as the Universal, to the individual consciousness.

Reminiscence.

(a) The source of our knowledge of the Divine is the same that we mentioned before when speaking of Socrates. The Mind of man contains the very essence [i. e. self-existence] in itself, and in order to acquire a knowledge of the divine, one must develop it in himself and bring it to consciousness. While, however, with the Socratic school this discussion concerning the immanence of science in the Mind of man [i. e. its self-origination] occurs in the form of the question, whether virtue can be taught; and with the sophist Protagoras takes the form of the question, whether sensation is the true—(a

question which touches closely the content of science as well as the distinction of it from opinion): while these views had been advanced before him, Plato went further, and held that the culture for this scientific cognition is not a learning as such, but that what we seem to learn is nothing else than REMINISCENCE. To this subject Plato frequently alludes, but he treats it most at length in the "Meno"; in which place he asserts that there can be nothing really learned, but that learning is rather only a process of recalling that which we possess already, and that the effort which consciousness makes to learn anything is only the excitant to recollection. Plato thus gives a speculative meaning to that question in so far as it relates to the nature of scientific cognition, and not to the empirical view of the process of acquiring knowledge. To *learn*—namely, according to the ordinary notion of it—expresses the taking up of a foreign somewhat into the thinking consciousness: a kind of mechanical combination and filling up of an empty space with things which are themselves of a foreign nature and indifferent to the space which they fill. Such an external state of relation toward that which has come into it—a relation in which the soul appears as *tabula rasa*—belongs to that style of thinking which makes out the growth of a living being to be a mere addition of particles, and is something dead, and unfitting for the nature of Mind, which is subjectivity, unity, being which is by-itself, and eternal in its nature. Plato, however, conceives the true nature of consciousness (in the doctrine of Reminiscence), spirit to be—in which there already exists that which is its object; in other words, spirit is that Being which is *for-itself*. This doctrine contains the comprehension [or exhaustive definition] of the true universal in its movement; the genus, which is in itself its own becoming [or self-generating] since it is already *in itself* [potentially] what it is to become subsequently *for-itself*;—a movement in which it does not proceed beyond itself [but moves in a circle]. This absolute GENUS is spirit, whose movement is only the constant return into itself; so that nothing is *for* it which is not *in* it itself: to learn, according to this, is this movement in which no foreign somewhat is added to it, but instead thereof *its own essence becomes for it*, i. e. it comes to consciousness of itself. That

which is not yet learned is the soul, the consciousness represented as natural being. That which excites mind to science is this appearance (and the confusion caused by it), that the essence of spirit exists as its other, as its negative: a form of appearance [its own appearance as *other* to itself] which contradicts its essence; for mind [spirit] has, or is, the internal certitude that it is all reality. Since it cancels this appearance of the other being [of being objective to itself], it *comprehends* the objective, i. e. arrives at a consciousness of itself, and by so doing reaches science. Images (representations) of individual, temporal, transitory things come, of course, from without; but such is not the case with universal thoughts which, as the True, have their root in the Mind and belong to its nature; through this [universal thought], then, is all external authority rendered superfluous.

Recollection [Ger. *Erinnerung*], in one sense, is an unfitting expression: namely, in this, that it signifies the reproduction of a representation which one has had already at another time. But recollection [*Erinnerung* = internalizing] has also another sense which its etymology gives it, namely, that of [Re-collecting] going into itself: this is the deep meaning of the word [it is scarcely found in English]. In this sense, it can certainly be said that the cognition of the Universal is nothing but a going-into-onesself: that which shows itself at first in an external form [i. e. is sensuously perceived], and is determined as a manifold, is converted by us into something internal, a universal, through the act by which we go into ourselves and recall to mind what is in the depths of our soul. With Plato however, it is not to be denied, the expression "recollection" has chiefly the empirical sense first named. This happens because Plato states the true comprehension (that consciousness is in itself the content of knowing), partly, in the form of representation [i. e. through symbols] and mythically; so that just here the already mentioned mingling of representation and of comprehension enters. In "Meno" Socrates undertakes to show, by questioning a slave who had had no instruction, that learning is a recollection. Socrates asks him questions and lets him answer according to his own opinion, without teaching him anything, or asserting anything to be true; and brings him through this finally

to the expression of a geometrical proposition of the ratio of the diameter [diagonal] of a square to its side. The slave draws out of himself the science, so that it seems as if he only recollected what he already knew but had forgotten. When Plato calls this procedure of drawing out science from consciousness a recollection, it involves the assumption that it already has been once actually in the consciousness: i. e. that the individual consciousness has not only in itself [potentially], according to its essence, the content of knowing, but also has already *been* in possession of it as this individual consciousness, and not in general. But this element of individuality belongs only to the stage of representation; and recollection is not thought [technically speaking], for Recollection has its function in man as a sensuous individual, and not as being Universal. The nature of the production of science is on this account here mixed up with what is individual, i. e. with representation; and cognition here enters in the form of *soul*, as the form of the in-itself [potentially] existing essence, the *one*, since the soul is only a moment [an element] of spirit. Inasmuch as Plato here passes over into the loose style of thinking (i. e. with images), whose content has no longer the pure signification of the Universal but only of the individual, he gives to its further development a mythical shape. He imagines that being-in-itself of spirit in the form of a pre-existence in time, as though the True had existed for us at some former time. But at the same time it is to be remarked that he gives this not as a philosophical doctrine but in the shape of a tradition (*saga*) which he has received from priests and priestesses who are well-informed [“posted up”] in divine things. Similar things are narrated by Pindar and other divine men. According to these traditions, the soul of man is immortal, and that which one calls death ceases to be, but the soul comes [after it] again into existence, and in nowise perishes: “If now the soul is immortal and frequently reappears” (metempsychosis), “and has seen all—that which is in Hades” (in unconsciousness) “just as well as that which is here—then there is no such thing as *learning*; it is only a recalling of that which has been seen elsewhere.” This allusion to the Ægyptian doctrine, though it is only a sensuous determinateness, is seized upon by the

historians of philosophy, who tell us that “Plato *has affirmed* that,” &c.; but Plato has not “affirmed” these things; it does not belong at all to philosophy, and above all not to his own philosophy; nor is that which we shall find afterwards concerning God to be considered his philosophy.

(b) In other dialogues this *mythus* is further and more splendidly developed; he alleges, in the ordinary acceptation of the term “recollection,” that the mind of man has seen at a former time that which develops in it its consciousness of the true and in-itself-existent. It is however, in this connection, Plato’s chief endeavor to show by this doctrine of reminiscence that Spirit, Soul, Thinking in-and-for-itself, is free; and this has with the ancients, and especially in the Platonic style of representing it, an immediate connection with that which we call the Immortality of the Soul.

(aa) In Phædrus, Plato speaks of it where he attempts to show that Love (*Eros*) is a divine mania given to us for the greatest happiness. This is an enthusiasm which is a mighty, all-prevailing impulse toward the Idea: but it is no enthusiasm of the breast or of feeling, no intuition, but a consciousness and knowledge of the Ideal. Plato says he must explain the nature of the divine and human soul in order to explain Eros [Phædrus, 51]: “The first [position] is that the soul is immortal. For that which moves itself is immortal and unchangeable; but whatever has its movement from another is changeable. Whatever moves itself is [a prime mover or] Principle; for it has its origin and beginning in itself and from no other: and just as little can it cease to move itself; for only that ceases which has its movement from another.” Plato develops thus at first the simple comprehension of the soul as the self-moving, which [the soul] is in so far a moment [subordinate element] of spirit; but the real life of spirit in-and-for-itself is the consciousness of the absoluteness and freedom of the *ego* itself. If *we* [moderns] speak of the immortality of the soul, we generally represent it as a physical thing which has properties: and while these may be changed, it [the soul] is so constituted as to be independent of them and not subject to change. Among these properties of the soul, which in that case are represented as independent of the thing [i. e. the soul], there is found that of thinking; and the

thinking activity is here determined as though it were a thing, and as though it could perish and cease to be. In this question, therefore, it is the interest of the doctrine presented in this style to represent the soul as an unchangeable thing that can subsist without having fancy, thought, &c. With Plato, on the contrary, the immortality of the soul depends immediately upon the fact that the soul itself is the thinking activity; so that thought is not a property of the soul, but its substance. It is with the attributes of the soul just as it is with those of a body; gravity is not a quality of a body, but its substance: just as the body would no longer exist if gravity [i. e. all attraction—cohesion and its other forms] were removed, so the soul would not any longer exist if the thinking activity were taken away. Thinking is the activity of the Universal; it, however, is not an abstraction, but that which is reflected into itself, that which posits itself identical with itself, a process which takes place in all representations [i. e. in representing I am conscious that the image or picture in my mind is my own production]; while the thinking activity is unchangeable and remains self-contained throughout all change, the soul itself is that which preserves its identity while in another: e. g. in sensuous intuition it is involved with another, with external material, and yet it preserves its self-identity at the same time. Immortality has, therefore, with Plato not the interest which it has with us in a religious aspect; it is rather connected by Plato with the nature of thinking, i. e. with its internal freedom; and thus it is united to that doctrine which lies at the basis of that which is the chief characteristic of the Platonic philosophy, to wit: this supersensuous foundation which Plato has established; with Plato, therefore, the immortality of the soul is also of the greatest importance.

The Lapse of the Soul.

[*Phædrus*, 53–55:] “The exposition of the soul,” he continues, “is a long and divine investigation; but a similitude thereof may easily be given in a human mode.” Here follows the allegory, which is, however, somewhat motley and inconsistent. He says: “The soul is likened unto the united power of a chariot and driver.” This image [unfamiliar to our time]

does not speak to us. “The horses,” (the impulse) “and the charioteers of the gods are good and from a good source. Our charioteer guides the reins; but only one of the [our] horses is beautiful and good and of such origin, the other is the opposite and of opposite pedigree. On this account the guiding is difficult and troublesome. How the terms mortal and immortal apply to this being we must attempt to explain. Every soul is anxious about that which is inanimate, and wanders through the whole heavens passing from one idea into another. If it is perfect and winged, it soars aloft,” i. e. has sublime thoughts, “and regulates the entire world. When, however, its wings sink, the soul impels itself around till it meets with something solid; it then assumes an earthly body which it moves through its own power; and the whole is called an animal, it being a soul and a body joined together, and has the appellation of mortal.” The one is thus the soul as a thinking activity, that which is in-and-for-itself; the other is the combination of it with matter. This transition from thinking to corporeal nature is very difficult, and for the ancients too difficult to comprehend; we shall see more concerning it when we come to treat of Aristotle. From what has been said one can see the ground of the view which generally prevails concerning the Platonic philosopheme, that the soul has existed for itself before this life, and from thence has lapsed into matter, united itself with it and thereby polluted itself with it, and that its destination is to abandon matter again. The connection of the two sides which arise in the process by which the spiritual realizes itself from and out of itself is a point that is not discussed in all its depth by the ancients; they have two abstractions, soul and matter, and the connection is expressed only in the form of the LAPSE of the soul.

“But the immortal,” continues Plato“—if we do not express it according to scientific thought, but picture it in conformity with the style of representation, which does not discern nor adequately comprehend God,—the immortal life of God is that in which he possesses a body and a soul, but which are united through their essential nature,” i. e. made one not in an external manner, but in and for themselves. Soul and body are two abstractions, life is the unity of both; and since God’s

nature is defined for the representation [i. e. expressed symbolically] as that whose soul and body are indivisibly in one, he is therefore Reason, whose form and content are inseparably one. This is a great definition of God, a great idea which indeed, for that matter, is no other than the definition of modern times: the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, the inseparableness of the ideal and real,—i. e. of the soul and the body. The mortal, the finite, is on the contrary determined by Plato correctly as that whose existence is not absolutely adequate to the idea, or, in other words, to the form of subjectivity.

Plato now describes further how it comes to pass in the life of the divine essence, what spectacle the soul has before it, and how the loss of its wings happens: “The chariots of the gods travel along in ranks, which the leader Jupiter conducts, driving his winged chariot. The host of other gods and goddesses, arranged in eleven divisions, follow him; and each performing his part, they act the most magnificent and blessed spectacles. The substance, devoid of color, shape, and feeling, allows thought alone, that which guides the soul, to be its spectator: and thus there arises for it true science. [See Kapila, LIX. to LXVI., p. 228, vol. II. *Jour. Sp. Phil.*] Thus it sees that which IS, and lives in the contemplation of the True since it follows the circle (of ideas) which returns into itself. In this circle” (of gods) “it beholds Justice, Temperance, and Science, not [as qualities] of that which we call ‘things,’ but as existing in truth in-and-for-itself.” This is now expressed after the manner of an occurrence or event. When the soul comes back from this exhibition [spectacle], the charioteer takes his horses to the manger, feeds them with ambrosia, and waters them with nectar. This is the life of the gods. But other souls, fallen into tumult through failure on the part of the charioteer or of the horses, issue with broken wings from that celestial region, cease to see the truth [i. e. mistake appearance for real being], nourish themselves with the food of Opinion, and fall upon the earth; according to its experience—the fact of its having seen more or less—it comes to a higher or lower station here. In this condition, it still has a recollection of that which it saw; and if it spies anything beautiful, just, &c., it is beside itself with enthusi-

asm. The wings again gain power; and the soul, especially of the philosopher, remembers its former condition in which it saw not merely *something* beautiful, *something* just, &c., but Beauty and Justice themselves." Since the life of gods is possible for the soul, when in the presence of the individual Beautiful, it is reminded of the Universal, it follows that there exists in the soul (just as in such existence in-and-for-itself) the idea of the Beautiful, Good, Just, as of existences in-and-for-themselves and which are in-and-for-themselves Universal. This constitutes the general basis of the Platonic theory. When Plato speaks of science as reminiscence, he intends to have this taken only in a symbolical or allegorical sense. He does not take this in the sense that certain theologians have done, who seriously debated the question whether the soul had pre-existed before its birth, and if so, where. It cannot be shown that Plato believed this, and he never spoke of it in the sense that the theologians discuss it; just as little evidence is there that he thought this life to be a lapse from a perfect condition, or an incarceration, &c. But that which Plato expresses as truth is this: that Consciousness is, in its form as Reason, the divine essence and life; that man looks upon it in pure thinking and cognizes it, and this cognition itself is this celestial abode and activity.

(bb) More distinctly, cognition makes its appearance in its form as soul in the passage where Plato in the *Phædon* has unfolded these notions of the immortality of the soul. What in the *Phædrus* is stated as a myth, and clearly distinguished from a scientific statement of the truth, is not thus carefully discriminated in the *Phædon*, that famed dialogue in which Plato makes Socrates speak of the immortality of the soul. That Plato connects this investigation with the history of the death of Socrates, has seemed worthy of admiration in all ages. There seems nothing more fitting than to place the argument in favor of immortality in the mouth of him who is on the point of departure from this life, and to animate that conviction through this scene, as well as such a death reciprocally through the conviction. It is at the same time to be remarked that what is fitting under the circumstances would seem to be this: that it becomes a dying person first to busy himself with his own fate instead of the

Universal—with this certitude of himself as a particular being instead of with truth. We therefore meet here with the least degree of separation between the forms of representation and of the comprehension; but in this exposition the form of representation is far removed from descending to the crude view which conceives the soul as a thing, and, in the style of speaking of a thing, asks after its duration or its subsistence. We find Socrates affirming that the body and what appertains to body is a hindrance to the striving after wisdom and to the exclusive pursuit of philosophy, for the reason that sensuous intuition shows nothing pure as it is in itself, and that what is true is to be known only through removal of the soul from what is corporeal. For Justice, Beauty, and the like generic entities, are alone what truly exists, that to which all change and death is foreign; and it is not through the body, but through the soul alone, that they are contemplated. (*Phædo* 23–38.)

In this separation we see the essence of the soul considered not as if it were a “thing,” but as the Universal: still more is this the case in the following passages, through which Plato proves immortality. One of the principal thoughts in this proof is the one already considered, that the soul has already existed before this life, because learning is only reminiscence (*Phædo* 49–57); which involves that the soul is already in itself [i. e. potentially] what it will become for itself. One ought not, in this connection, to have recourse to the wretched theory of “innate ideas”: an expression which implies a natural being of ideas, as though the thoughts were already in some measure fixed, and had a natural being that did not originate through the activity of spirit. But Plato lays most stress on this argument for immortality: the composite is subject to dissolution and decay; the simple, on the contrary, can be in no manner dissolved and destroyed; what, however, is always like itself, and the same, is simple. This simple—the Beautiful and Good, the self-identical, is incapable of any change; while, on the contrary, those in whom these universals exist—men, things, &c.—are changeable, and perceptible by the senses; but the former is supersensuous. The soul on this account, which exists as a thinking being, and associates with simple essences as with its kindred, must

on this account be held for a simple nature. Here, then, it is clear again that Plato takes simplicity not as simplicity of a thing, e.g. not as the simplicity of a chemical element which can be shown as incapable of further analysis; such simple being as this would be only the empty abstract identity or universality, the simple as a being [or thing].

Finally, however, [in the dialogue referred to—the *Phædo*] the Universal actually makes its appearance in the shape of a thing; this occurs where Plato makes Simmias assert in this respect: a harmony that we hear is nothing else than a universal, a simple which is a unity of different things; this harmony, however, is connected with a sensuous thing, and vanishes with it just as the music of the lyre perishes with the destruction of the lyre. In answer to this, Plato makes Socrates show that the soul is not a harmony of this kind; for this sensuous harmony originates after the things exist and as a result of the same, but the harmony of the soul is in-and-for-itself before all sensuous being. The sensuous harmony has, moreover, different degrees of pitch, while the harmony of the soul has no quantitative distinctions whatever. From this it is clear that Plato holds the essence of the soul to be quite universal, and posits its true being not in its sensuous individuality; accordingly also the immortality of the soul cannot be taken by him in the sense in which we take it, namely, as that of an individual thing. When now, furthermore, the myth comes to treat of the residence of the soul after death in another more splendid and glorious earth, we may readily understand what to make of it.

Education.

(c) As regards the education and culture of the soul, it is connected with the theory just considered. But one must not think the idealism of Plato to be a subjective idealism, or a spurious idealism like that which has become prevalent in modern times, which holds the doctrine that one learns nothing at all from without, and is not in any way externally determined, but generates all its representations from itself as subject. Idealism is frequently defined as the doctrine which represents the individual as creating in himself all his ideas, even the most immediate ones, by his own activity.

This is, however, an unhistorical, quite false notion ; in the sense that this crude theory defines idealism, there are no idealists, at least among philosophers [nor outside a lunatic asylum], and certainly the Platonic idealism is very far removed from it. In the seventh book of his *Republic*, Plato speaks—in connection with that which I have already cited [the allegory of the cave]—especially of the manner in which this learning—through which the universal, previously implicit in spirit, is developed out of it—is accomplished : “ We must hold this view respecting science and the process of learning, that they are not so constituted as some have given out” (he means thereby the Sophists) “ who speak of culture as though knowing is not contained in the soul, but as if one had to introduce science into the soul in the same manner that seeing is placed in blind eyes.” This notion, that knowing comes entirely from without, is found in modern times with very abstract, crude, empirical philosophers, such, e.g., as have asserted that all that man knows of the divine comes in through education and habit, and hence that spirit is only a quite undetermined possibility of knowledge. The extreme phase of this view is the doctrine of revelation, in which all is given from without. In the Protestant Religion this crude view does not occur in its abstract form ; in it [i.e. Protestantism] the “testimony of the spirit” is considered as belonging essentially to faith ; in other words, it is essential that the individual subjective spirit (in-and-for-itself) shall contain and posit the internal sense of the dogma which is given to it by external authority. Hence Plato speaks against that view, and remarks in relation to the above allegoric myth: “ Reason teaches that in each man there dwells, as an immanent faculty of his soul, the organ with which he learns ; namely, as if the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body moved with it ; in this manner one must be turned away with the whole soul from the transient occurrences surrounding him” (the contingent sensations and representations) towards the [truly] existent till he is capable of enduring the contemplation of the highest clearness of existence. This existent, however, we term the good. Its art would be the art of instruction how to turn the soul round so as to contemplate existence ; and indeed in what manner to turn it around in

the easiest and most effective way, not for the sake of implanting the sight in him, because he has it already, but is not properly turned towards it, and does not see the object which he should see. The other virtues of the soul stand more nearly related to the body; they are not previously contained in the soul, but come into it by degrees through exercise and custom. The thinking activity, on the contrary, as possessing a divine nature, never loses its power, but becomes good or evil through the mode in which it is turned toward existence or its opposite. This is a close statement of the relation which Plato establishes between the internal and external. With us [moderns] such views as make spirit the source of the determinations of the good, &c., are much more current. Plato, however, was engaged in the task of fixing these doctrines for the first time.

Four Grades of Knowing.

c. Since Plato places the truth in that alone which is produced through thought, while the source of knowledge is at the same time manifold (feeling, sensation, &c.) it becomes necessary for us to mention the different kinds of knowing as classified by him. The view that truth is given through the sensuous Consciousness which has for content the well known [i. e. familiar objects] from which we begin [our knowledge], is a view which Plato opposes everywhere as the doctrine of the Sophists. [Hegel unfolds this fully in treating of Protagoras.] Feeling itself is easily persuaded that it contains all truth, as, e. g., that Platonic "mania for the Beautiful" contains the True in the form of feeling; this is, however, not the true form of the True, for the reason that feeling is a wholly subjective phase of consciousness. Feeling, as such, is exactly the form in which one makes caprice a determination [i. e. a characteristic] of the True, for in feeling there is no true content fixed [i. e. the object of the feeling cannot be given through feeling, but must always be given by the intelligence], for in that [i. e. feeling] any content may have place. Moreover [according to this view], the highest content must be in feeling; to have in the memory, or in the understanding, is for us quite other than to have in the heart, in the feeling, i. e. in our innermost subjectivity, in our Ego;

and in so far as the content is in the heart, we say it is in the true place, because it is then quite identical with our special individuality. The misunderstanding lies in this: a content is not true for the very reason that it is in *our feeling*. It is, therefore, the great doctrine of Plato that the content is supplied only through thought; for it [the content] is the universal, which can be apprehended only through the activity of thinking. This universal content, Plato has defined in a precise manner as Idea.

At the end of the sixth book of the Republic, Plato gives the distinction between the sensuous and intellectual in our knowing with more detail: he again sets up two phases of consciousness in each province [i. e. making four grades of thinking in all]: "In the sensuous [the visible world], one division is the external phenomena, as for example shadows, images in water, as well as reflections in dense, smooth, shining bodies, and the like. The second kind comprehends those similar to the former: animals, plants (concrete life)," and everything of an artificial nature. In the intelligible there is also a two-fold content: The soul uses those sensuous images which we have just classified, and is necessitated to proceed from hypotheses which point not towards the principle but towards the result. Reflection, which is not by itself sensuous but belongs to the thinking activity, mixes in thought with the objects of sensuous consciousness, but its object is not yet a pure intelligible. "The other species" [of the intelligible] (that which is thought in the soul itself) "is that in which the soul, setting out from an hypothesis, makes its way through the idea itself to an unhypothetical principle without the aid of those images which we use in the former instance. The form of thinking which deals with geometry, arithmetic, and the like sciences, presupposes straight lines and curved lines, figures, three kinds of angles, and the like. And while they proceed from such presuppositions ["hypotheses"] they believe that they are in nowise bound to give any further reason for them—any more than of other well known affairs. Furthermore you know that they make use of visible figures, and speak of them, although they do not really mean these figures, but rather those [general] principles of which they are mere visible copies, since they intend

to make their demonstration apply to the square and its diagonal in general" (the universal one), "and not merely to that" (sensuous) "one which they draw as a diagram; and so it is, too, with other things." This is the place where science, as such, begins according to Plato, inasmuch as it has no more to do with the sensuous as such; this, however, is not yet the true science, which treats of the spiritual Universal, for itself, but it is rather the deductive, argumentative [ratiocinative] cognition which forms itself general laws and definite species from the sensuous. "Those figures which they draw and describe, among which are shadows and images in water, they use only as images and seek to see their original, which one can never see except with the intellect.—Truly spoken!—This, then, is what I have above indicated as that species of thought in whose investigation the soul is obliged to use presuppositions [hypotheses], for the reason that it does not rise to principles, inasmuch as it cannot transcend those presuppositions, but employs these subordinate images as pictures which are made perfectly like those originals, and are by this fact completely defined.—I understand that you speak of that which takes place in geometry and other like sciences.—Learn now to know the other division of the intelligible which attaches to Reason itself inasmuch as it makes use of hypotheses, through the dialectic, not as principles, but as hypotheses ought to be used—as preliminary steps and starting-points; with this they attain to that which has no presuppositions [the unhypothetical], the principle of All," which is in-and-for-itself; "it seizes an object, and, again seizing what was involved in the former [i. e. its presuppositions], ascends to a new result, and all the while it uses for that purpose no sensuous element at all, but only ideas themselves, and thus through them alone it arrives at ideas [i. e. the most comprehensive ones] in the end." To master the science of this is the interest and business of Philosophy; this field is explored by the pure thought in-and-for-itself, which is active only in such pure thoughts.—"I understand it, but not yet quite clearly. You seem to me to wish to assert that what is considered through the science of the dialectic [movement] of existence and thought, is clearer than what is considered in those so-called sciences whose principles are hypothetical,

and that those who consider them are obliged to do so with the intellect and not with the senses. Since, however, in such processes they do not ascend to an absolute principle, but speculate with hypotheses, they seem not to possess thought itself [i. e. pure thought] in considering these objects, though they are *like* thoughts with a principle [at their basis]. You seem with reason to name the course of procedure employed in geometry and the kindred sciences, understanding [Greek = *dianoia*]; and to define it in such a manner that it is found between pure Reason [*Nous*] and the" (sensuous) "representation [*doxa*].— You have correctly understood me. Corresponding to these four distinctions I will name the four affections or faculties of the soul: the comprehending thinking [*Noesis*] is the highest; the understanding is the second; the third is called faith" [*pistis*], a knowledge appertaining to animals and plants, for the reason that they are vital, homogeneous, identical with us—the true sensuous representation; "and the last the pictured conceptions (mental images) [*Eikasia*]," i. e. opinion. Arrange them according to the degree of clearness [comprehensiveness] that each stage has, or [which is the same thing] according to the degree of truth there is in it." This is the distinction which lies at the basis of the teachings of Plato, and it is what he has been chiefly instrumental in bringing to light.

Three Divisions of Philosophy.

If we now proceed from cognition [in general] to its more definite content into which the idea specializes itself and thereby organizes itself into a scientific system: with Plato [for the first time in the history of philosophy] this content begins to fall asunder into three divisions, which we distinguish as Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. The logic was called by the ancients Dialectic, and its addition to philosophy is expressly ascribed to Plato by the ancient historians of philosophy. This is not a dialectic such as was used by the Sophists,—which was used to bring ideas into confusion generally; but this first branch of the Platonic philosophy is the dialectic which is active in pure thoughts, the movement of the speculative logic with which several of the dialogues, e. g. the *Parmenides*, is en-

gaged. The second division is a kind of Nature-Philosophy whose fundamental principles are to be found chiefly in the *Timæus*. The third is the Philosophy of Spirit, a system of Ethics, and above all his expositions of a perfect State in the *Republic*. To the *Timæus* and the *Republic* should be added the *Critias*, which we cannot now make much use of, since there is only a fragment left of it. These three dialogues Plato gives as the continuation of one connected discourse. With the *Timæus* the *Critias* is so coördinated that while the *Timæus* treats of the speculative origin of man and nature, the *Critias* exhibits the ideal history of human culture, a philosophical history of the human race illustrated by the history of the ancient Athenians as it was preserved by the Ægyptians; of this, however, only the commencement has come down to us. To the *Republic* and the *Timæus* is still to be added the *Parmenides*, and these three make a complete exposition of the Platonic philosophy in each of its three divisions. We will now proceed to consider in detail these three divisions. [To be concluded in the next number.]

GOETHE'S SOCIAL ROMANCES.

REVIEW OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

Translated from the German of Carl Rosenkranz by D. J. SNIDER.

The composition of the three romances which we have just considered according to their ideal signification, is wholly different. In the Apprenticeship it changes progressively. At first, the exposition is not at all rapid. From the ordinary tone of narration, it passes with the exhibition of the mode of living of strolling actors, into a dramatic activity. With the society of the noblemen, the style is pervaded by a fine flavor of irony. In the confessions of a fair saint, we admire the untainted, yet still highly cultivated naiveté with which the innermost struggles of a noble soul are laid open to us. Her contemplative tranquillity disperses the actors' bustle, and the frivolities attending it, by unfolding to us the duodrama of a soul struggling with God. After this begins the elegiac tragical vein, in the scenes that describe the death